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ECONOMICS OF EXTERNAL BORROFING: THE LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINT 
AND THE TWO-GAP MODELS OF FOREIGN AID~'r 
The paper seeks to analyse some implications of the debt­
service requirements for the two-gap models of economic growth built 
around the notion of self-reliance. The analysis attempts to point 
out the inadequacy of the two-gap models of foreign aid when the exchange 
earnings available to the borrowing country from exports and from the 
non-committed portion of foreign loans are inadequate to meet the debt­
service requirernents. 1 The paper shows it explicitly that the terms 
of loans play a significant role in shaping the debt-retirement process 
not only in its influence over the size and the duration of the savings 
gap --- but also in the qualitative difference it introduces in the 
nature itself of the (foreign) resource gap. Thus while the conventional 
literature distinguishes between domestic and foreign resources as 
supplements to domestic investment and/or import capacity, 2 it does not 
*The author owes a large debt to Dr. Anisur Rahman and to Prof. RichardN. Cooper for their valuable comments and suggestions at crucial stagesof the present work. Thanks are also due to Prof. Robert Triffin forthe clarification of some basic notions. The responsibility of thepaper, however, entirely rests with the author. 
explicitly introduce the q·Jal:Ltati-,i, distinction betueen t~1e gaps in foreign 
resources and foreign exci:1ange (or simply, liquidity). The term of foreign 
loans, as it has been shO\•m below, can under certain circumstances, introduce 
a third pre-condition for the aid-cum grmJth process in terms of the 
3· t The paper introduces the institutional11.qu1.. "d"1.ty-margi n requ1.remen. 
features of public borrowing and seeks to examine the implications of such 
a programme of borrowing when the major portion of the gross inflow of 
capital are committed to the merchandise purchases in the current account. 
The consequences are quite serious when one recognises the alternatives open 
to the borrowing country under the existing institutional set-up. Thus 
the country facing such a crisis can meet the situation by drawing down 
the reserves, or, alternatively, by borrowing larger amounts at less 
favourable tenns. While the first method can never be a permanent solution 
to any country, the second one is accompanied by all its repercussions and 
reinforcing effects on the savings gap~ the trade gap, the liquidity margin, 
and on the terminal date for self-reliance.
4 
The tenns at which a country can borrow are influenced to a 
Itconsiderable extent by the conditions of supply governing such loans. 
is important to recognise that the supply situation of foreign aid as 
visualized by the individual recipient of foreign aid is quite different from 
what the donor (or the donors) takes it to be. Thus the recipients are often at 
too low a scale in their bargaining strength in relation to the donors to be 
able to exercise decisions on a joint basis. It is apparent that the overall 
supply schedule of foreign loans is always an upward rising one since aid 
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other than grants are often sensitive to the terms offered in the market 
and a sizeable portion of loans are offered at commercial terms. For the 
recipient as a single country, however, one can conceptually visualize 
a step-function type of supply schedule for foreign capital4 (a) --- each 
step representing the maximum flow of loans at particular loan terms. 
The range of continuity of each st2p, again, may be shorter at higher ranges 
of lcian terms. The aid-composite at each weighted averaf?e of loan-
terms, therefore, is almost det~rmL:ied for the bor:ro,;dng ccuntry and the 
maximum amount of loans it is able to obtain at a partic·.2lar. loan term 
may not always be adequate to meet its total require171ents, The 
alternatives left open to the recipient often consist of an excess demand 
for foreign resources, an effective matching of total demand at terms less 
5favourable than before, or, lastly, a rescheduling of t:he ciebt-
structure as a temporary solution of the problem. 
The present paper introduces certain changes in the contents of a 
few conventional concepts used in the existing literature on foreign aid. 
Thus the inflow of foreign resources necessary under the two-gap estimates 
is considered in its net rather than in its gro·ss entirety and the savings-gap 
is defined as the foreign resource necessary to supplement domestic savings 
net of foreign claims. On~ can here recall the debt-cycle models of savings-
gap analysis6 built around the assumption of a terminal date for capital 
inflow. The contribution of forei3n l•Jans towards saving is in reality 
limited to the initial phase when such loans contribute towards domestic 
investment. It is useful to introduce the concept of the savings-coefficient 
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of foreign loans which relates to the entire period during which foreign 
aid is forthcoming. Thus adverse changes in the terms of borrowing 
lengthen the time-period necessary to pay off such loans with a consequent 
reduction in the value of the coefficient. A recent work on the 
economic criteria of foreign loans has established an inverse relation be­
tween the savings-potentiality (or the coefficient, as defined above) 
7and the terms of such inflow. The debt-retirement schedule has a more 
significant bearing on the trade-gap implicit in the growth process. It 
is henceforth defined as the amount of foreign resource necessary to sup­
plement the domestically earned resources from abroad net of all foreign 
claims. The inclusion of forei8n claims makes for a close relation between 
the magnitude of the trade-gap and the terms of foreign loans. While there 
8
has been some attempt in the literature to incorporate the above relation 
in terms of the bearing of loan terms on the amount of gross capital inflow 
necessary to maintain a stipulated grouth rate in the merchandise balance, 
the more complete trade-cum-growth models do not introduce the 
complications. It is more important in the context of the present paper 
to distinguish the above two gars in foreie:,. resources from a third one which 
9is described as the 'foreign exchange' or 'liquidity' gap. The latter 
can operate as a pre-condition for tts ai.d-cum-p;r-:mth process whenever. the 
liquid portion of foreign loans (which consists of generally c1vailable free 
exchange) constitute a fraction of the total flow of such loans. The 
terms of loans can be defined in a generalise('!_ way to cover the tied loans 
and the residual elements in the terms of loans, viz., the interest rate and 
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the maturity-, have an equally significant bearinp. on their quantitative 
implications on the liquidity margin, The next section develops the conditions 
where the liquidity-margin requirement can operate as a third gap for the 
foreign aid models and explores the structural implications of the 
constraint. It examines the time-path of the liquidity margin under certain 
specific assumptions of a simplified model for a borrowing economy and ana­
lyses a few empirical solutions to project the liquidity requirement for 
the borrowing countries. The concluding section brings together the im­
plications of the analytical and the empirical solutions for the existing 
institutional set-up. 
II 
The terms of tied loans have some influence on the size as well as 
the composition of the gross capital inflow. The qualitative aspect 
of the foreign-resource gap however, can only be specified under the 
following institutional assumptions uhich are often less explicit under 
the real growth models: 
(i) Currencies are inconvertible bet,.;een countries. The 
assumption, while implicit in the resource--gap r:iodels of aid, should be 
explicit in all growth models which distinguish between domestic and 
foreign resources. 
(ii) The import coefficient may change with changes in the exchange 
control mechanism and/or a different weightage from the different sectors. 
Thus the availability of the loan itself may increase the foreign resource­
gap with a certain relaxation of the import-control mechanism, or simply, 
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with additional purchases by the government itself. 
(iii) Foreign loans may be accompanied by contractual purchases in 
the current account. This reduces the potentiality of such loans to meet 
the liquidity as distinct from the foreign resource requirement of the 
recipient. Thus the loans tied to the purchases of the recipients are 
hardly as efficient in meeting the need for liquid foreign resources as 
these are to meet the resource-gap for the borrower. Thus the institutional 
pattern of the loans often introduce an additional element of inflexibility 
in the debt-servicing process for the recipients. Since a large portion of 
the tot 1 1oans easi·1y tie. d t o imports, he rate oa can be . lO t actua1 f gross 
lending, though adequate in terms of the stipulated requirements to cover 
the trade-gap, may not be sufficient to meet a liquidity crisis when the 
exchange earnings from exports are smaller than the outstanding debt­
charges. Thus a simple increase in the volume of foreign aid is unlikely 
t o he1pthe debt-service ur eat-service ratio. b den wenth he d' · · ll is 
sharply increased with mounting debt-service requirements. 
One can develop the liquidity margin requirement as an additional 
constraint for an open economy whenever the inflow of foreign resources, 
as indicated in the above assumptions, are different from the generally 
available exchange under the tied loans with contractual terms of purchases. 
The following set of equations illustrate the basic nature of the problem 
under certain simplifying assumptions regardin~ the variables of the 
model. Thus the three instrument variables of the model, viz., i, 
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o (reciprocal of amortisation period) and >..(the 1iquid portion of foreign 
loans) remain unchanged during the time period under consideration. More­
over, the model accepts an exogenous rate of growth in exports (x) and 
imports (m) which remain unchanged during the specified time period. Thus 
it does not introduce the functional relationship between Ft, the gross 
inflow of loans, the import-coefficient and the trade-gap itself --- as 
. d . h d · ·mentione int e secon assumption given abave. lZ The assumptions help to 
illuminate the basic nature of the problem as described in the following 
set of definitional relations: 
... 
(1) = X (1 + X) L +Lt 0 
= M (1 + m) t (1 >..) F 
0 t 
The liquidity margin in period t equals the value of export earnings in 
the same period plus the liquid portion (A) of the gross inflow of loans 
Ft net of interest (i) and amortisation charges (o) on the loans outstan-
B = B ("1 + 1) + M (1 + m)t-l - X (1 + x)t-l: Loanst t-1 0 0 
outstanding in period t equals the outstanding indebtedness in the preceeding 
period, the interest charges on it and the merchandise balance during the 
preceeding period. 
{3) F = (i + O)B + M {1 + m)t - X (1 + x)t: The gross inflow oft t O 0 
loans in period t equals the interest and the amortisation changes on the 
loans outstanding during the current period plus (or shortfall)an excess 
of imports over exports during the current period. Ft, as indicated above, 
can be identified to the trade-gap as defined in the present paper. 
The equations are self-explanatory with the follo~in~ set of 
terminology: 
X: value of exports in the initial period o 
0 
M: value of imports in the initial period o 
0 
i: rate of interest 
a: the inverse of T, the period of amortisation. An amount which 
falls due in each period on the assumption of a linear rate of amortisation. 
A: the lj_quid portion of loans under the terms of tied credits 
x,m: exogenous rates of growth for exports and imports. 
The model incorporates the implications of the debt-service requirements 
for the borrowing economy in the process of growth. Hhile equation (3) 
restates the 'trade-gap' in terms of the debt-service requirements, 
equation (1) indicates the need for an additional target in terms of a 
possible gap between the total supply of 2-nd the need for internationally 
liquid resources. The equality condition indicates the possibility of a 
crisis whenever Lt drops down to zero. Strictly speaking, Lt can never 
be negative since it is always financed ex post by external liquid resources. 
There can, however, be always an ex ante situation where the borrowing coun­
try can always forecast a negative Lt and try to correct the situation by 
changing the values of the parameters (i,o, and;\) whenever Lt tends to 
decline to zero. The recipient clear1.v finds it unnecessary to deplete 
its external resources, to borrow at less favourable terms or to ask for 
a rescheduling of loans so long Lt is :,ositive. It is thus important for 
the borrowing country to maintain a positive liquidi~y margin in order to 
avoid adverse changes in th,~ terns of nar~inal harrowing and/or in the 
desired ratio of the c.r.P. covered by such borrowing. 
It is useful to study the time-path cf the liquidity-margin and 
analyse the structural nature of the probJ.em under the above assumptions 
regarding the variables of the model. For a medium-term solution of the 
time-path of the liquidity-margin Lt, the values of the instrument variables, 
viz., i, a and).. can be assumed to be unchanging and the two variables x and 
mare determined outside the system. As mentioned elsewhere in the paper, 
the repercussions of Ft (the gross inflow of capital) are likely to reduce 
the liquidity margin during the medium-term with the possibility of 
sharp increases in the value of imports and a less than remarkable change 
in the value of exports during the period. The model, it is interesting 
to note, is particularly suitable to provide a meaningful solution for the 
medium term (say, when t does not exceed 25) since the instruments are less 
likely to have constant values 1-1hen the institutions are subject to changes. 
What is more, the model with its uncl-:anr,ing parameters is completely 
inadequate to explain the s:l_tuaticn: ~-:h2neve:. Lt (defined ~ ante) is 
negative. Thus the ex post financing of a liquidity crisis implies a 
change in at least one among the three parameters with or without similar 
changes in the exogenous growth rates for exports and imports. The 
model, clearly, has to be redefined in such a situation with new values both 
for the different variables and for the inital conditions. 
The liquidity-margin Lt can be defined in terms of Bt and one can get 
(la) .L )'. (1 + 71)1. 
0 
where a=l - A and B=(i + o). 
The time path of Lt and Bt are defi.ned by the following two difference 
equations: 
(lb) - r t xax (1 + x)- + mAM (1 + m)
0 0 
and 
(3a) (i + l)(B - B. ) + mn (1 + m)t-l - xx (1 + x)t-l
· t r-1 o o 
Both the equations can be simplified in terms of the operator notation 
E to obtain, 
(4) L (E - 1) + aSB (E - l) = xaX (1 + x)-t- + mAM (1 + m) t t t 0 0 
(5) B (E - 1) (E - i - 1) = mM (J. + ,n) t - xx (1 + x) t 
t 0 0 
The second-order difference-equation in Bt can be solved to get the 
following analytical colution for the initial values B and B1 ,0 
B = M (1 + m)t/(m - i) + K (1 + i)t - X (1 + x)t/(x - i)t O 2 0 
where K = (B - B - mM / (rn - i) + xx / ( x - i) ) / i2 1 0 . 0 0 
The above, when substituted back to equation (4) can be used to solve the 
value for Lt and one gets the following for an initial value of L : 
0 
Lt= X (1 + x)t(l + 13/ (x - i)) + M (1 + m)t(A - aS/(m - i)) - aSK (1 + i)t + K
0 0 2 
where K = L + aSK'> - aX {l + _13_) - H {A - ~)3 0 ~ 0 0
X-i m-i 
3 
It i.s sign5.fJ.cant to note that •;,1hile the time-path of Lt is determined 
by the coefficient of the dominant root in the long-run, the intermediate 
solutions to the long-run can be significantly influenced by the changing 
weights of the different roots corresponding to different assumptions 
regarding the variables and the initial values. Such a case is particularly 
likely when the three roots assume small numerical values close to one 
another and the coefficients are more important in determining the solution. 
A simple exercise in numerical figures is sufficient to illustrate and 
establish the above statement. It is interesting to analyse a case which 
approximates the Indian situation with its implications for the choice 
of the instrument variables open to the policy-maker. 13 The following 
include certain plausible values for the parameters and the exogenous 
variables. The estimates include the initial conditions for India during 
1965-66 and seeke to project the liquidity-margirc situation for the next 
few decades when i and 0 are unchangi.r.~ and 1, is eiven at a value less than 
14,15unity. 
Solution 1 i>m>x 
i=0.06 Initial conditions: X =8.3 
0 
m=o.05 H =12.5 
0 
x=0.04 B =16.5 
0 
).=0.10 B1=21.5 
a=0.06 L =6.94 
0 
One can compute the values for K2 and K3 from the above figures and 
-· 
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the general solution for Lt is as follows: 
L = -37.35(1.04)t + 136.25(1.0S)t - 91.8(1.06)t - 0.5 
t 
The dominant root as well as one other root have negative 
coefficients in the solution and L tapers off uith a value of 3.02 
t 
for t=lO to one of -3.88 for t=l5 and -160.99 for t=40. 
Solution 2. x>m>i 
x=0.06 Initial conditions: L =7.39 
0 
m=0.05 
i=0.03 Rest as above. 
A and a as above. 
Lt= 29.88(1.06)t - 48.75(1.0S)t + 27.13(1.03)t - 8.60 
The solution is predominantly positive both in the medium and in the long 
term while the close value of x and m makes for a temporary decline in the 
value of Lt when tis 15. 
Solution 3. m>i>x 
x=0.03 Initial conditions: B =21.51 
m=0.06 L =7.06 
0 
i=0.05 
Rest as above 
Lt= -33.61(1.03)t - 122.50(1.06)t + 163.25(1.0S)t - .04 
The solution diverges towards larger negative values over time as it can 
be seen from the table given below. 






= -82.17(1.0S)t + 68.75(L04)t + 20.C9(l.06)t - 0.33 
The solution assumes a liegative value j_n the. long run only when t 
is 20. 
S olution 5. ro~ >i 




L =41.08(1.0S)t - 32.50(1.06)t - 0.31(1.03)t - 0.39t 
The solution, again, is neg2.tive in the longer run. 
Solution 6. x >i >m 




L =89.64(1.06)t + G3.12(1.03)t - l~.55(1.05)t - 131.11. t 
The solution represents the most favourable situation with the smallest 
value of m. 
The solutions recorded in the table reveal it significantly that 
the liquidity-margin Lt is influenced to a large extent by both the interest 
rate and by the relative value of x and m (compare solutions 1,4; 
2,5; 3,6 where relative changes in x and m bring about significant 
changes in Lt for unchanging rates of interest). The time-path of Lt 





j i>m>x x>m>i m>i>x :L>x>rn m>x>i x>i>m 1 
· Solution 1 2 3 4 5 6 
X .04 .06 03 .05 .05 .06 
t i .06 .03 .05 .Wi .03 .05 
m .05 .05 . 06 .04 .06 .03 
---,I 
10 3.02 5.57 --2. gg 4. '.>1 7.21 99.04 
15 -3.88 4.03 --5. Sf; 2.16 5.79 151. 32 
'; '='. 0.20 -14.88 7.23 - ~? 1 .. l;. -~· --LU 0:,,"' \.. 232.32I 
25 -29.41 11. 02 .,.43, 99 -- 7. 25 --2. 2c.';. 336 .18 
40 -160.99 43.80 -219.6'.! -:'S.11 -Li? .93 893. 72 
root, is often influenced by the second dominant root with larger 
values for its coefficients when the absolute values of the different 
roots are close to onE'. another. Thus '.:he stracturaJ. relation of the 
three variables, x, m and i, when close to :.me an::;ther, are more significant 
than their absolute values in dE te:ridLin;~ the marrin of liquidity. It 
is also significant to note that sma~.::. r.1argin<-.l chang-:.>s :::.r-. the three 
variables (e.g. between solutions 'f and 6) can bring about spectacular 
changes in the margin of liq:.ddity. There can even be a temporary reversal 
in the direct:Lon of change of the liquidity-margin durin3 the short-
term (solution 2, t=lS) folloFed by a more consistent trend for the longer 
run. The major directions in the time-path of Lt will be unchanged when 
the solutions are different with a different set of figures for A and cr. 
-15-
The crucial bearing of the equality condition :;.n the solutions, however, 
makes the siruat1.·on itself- c:iff-2.rert •,1ben I ci-.~naes -'ts sign from a- - 't •-~- b -'- ., 
positive figure. 
The significant nuture of the equal!ty condition in the 
liquidity-margin requi::-crn_e;1t J 1 akes it impc_ tant to ff.nd out the cri-
tical values of ,, , the liquid port:f on o:'- 2-o,,,n.s Fi th a non--negative 
(say zero) value of It "hid, is cons-.~ster.t ,·.'it:h & set of plausible 
values for the rest of the Vfiri:iblc:,~;. 'l_'he institutior.a::. pattern 
of borrowing with la:i'.'ge 'Tolumes cf tied 1rnrchsses (i.e., a small >..) 
makes it difficult for the iJOrrowin()' countries to meet the liqt:!idity 
margin requirement at the conventiona.1. terns of such borrowing coupled 
with the more likely rates of grm,•th for ttei r exports and imports. 
Or, to put it otherwise, the norrno.l c2:1x·r-:: perfo-.:-n:ance 2nd t':1e import 
requirements of the recipi<':nt c0untri.es make £or an inev:.table 
liquidity crisis for the reci.pie:1t rountriet: unless tl1ere t2Jcc place 
a change in the terms of their forecic;TI bcrr'.Y.,iPL (viz. l:.' interest 
rate, maturity or the :Liquid cornpor:2nt of loam;). The following 
table illustrates the basic dilernmci and the inconsistencj_es of the 
current institutional structure ½etHe.:m the lenc:1-:1.nr; and the borrowing 
countries. Thus a moderate estimate of mat 6 per cent per annum 
and a linear rate of amortisation within 15 years make it difficult 
to avoid a liquidity crisis uithin a twenty-five year time-period 
unless i) the growth rate for exports is sufficiently high, ii) the 
rate of interest is sufficiently low or, iii) the liquid ratio of 
-16-
loans, A is sufficiently large. It is interestinr; to note that the 
Choice of the four major irn:.truve:1::s s.r'.d variables in the model, viz. 
i, cr, A and x are often beyond the cc•nt:col of the recipient while 
a drastic change in the. ir:irort-grcwth rate 'm' is also hard to 
attain. Again, the predominance of tie,J credits (i.•~., a small A 
for any value of Ft), the diff:1_culties of increasing the export 
growth rates for the developing countries, the increasing import­
coefficient of domestic production, and lastlyj the rising cost 
(i.e.higher interest rate ard shorter maturity) of foreign capital 
make it hard for the borroHers to attain a set of the relevant 
variables cons:Lstent with a non-negative liquidity margin. 
Critical values of A for Lt=O 
B =16.5, X =8.3, M =12.5 
0 0 0 
m=.C-6, ::c=.06, t=25 
X .04 .05 • 1)6
i 
.03 .28 .14 * 
.04 .22 .18* 
.OS .90 .15* 
.06 * ** 
The table works out the critical values of:>.. for Lt=O under 
different assumptions regarding x and i and a set of unchanging 
values form and at 0.6. The solution is worked out for a finite 
time-period at t=25. The spaces marked by asteriks indicate certain 
--17-
values of ;i.. which are not mE.anins£u1 under the given circumstances. 
The large proportion of tied loans in the grass inflow of loans 
for India during the recent years (see Appendix Table 2 for the 
value of;\ between 10 to 15 per cent) toeether with the typical 
terms of such borrowing (see Appendix Table 1) make it hard for 
the country to meet the liquidity condition for the typical 
rates of increase of her imports and exports during the srowth 
process. Thus even an optimistic estimate of the export growth 
rate at 6 per cent require a;>,. at 18 or 15 per cent for certain 
plausible estimates of the terms of loans and the import growth 
rate. The table, however, reveals clearly the opposite influence 
of x as compared to j_ or o in relation to given values of Lt. 
The few solutions worked out above. do n·ot provide 
a complete exercise in the sensitivity of the liquidity margin 
for given changes in the ter;~, of fc:::ei.8n horrm-Jir,g or in the growth 
rates for exports a:1.c' :'r:morts. Th::-, t 1.~c ·:3_1:-•els, however, illustrate 
it perfectly well that the s~~uctura: condit~ons of the economy 
can be as important as the termfc ,,f fore:1 rn borrowing in determining 
the liquidity-marp:in for the borr0Pe::-s. Th'.ls Lt may be chane;ed 
with certain marginal adjustments ~n the values of x and m even 
without a corresponding chaq'.e in the tenns of borrowing i and cr. 
The model illustrates the nec~ssity of recognising the 
liquidity-requirement as a pre-condition for a successful process 
of debt-cum growth. The whole of ~:nalysis, of course, is based 
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on the prior hypothesis that the: h'.J!T:>wing countries do not 
anticipate an indefinite increase in their outstanding indebtedness. 
Thus the process of refinancing the loans, while permissible in 
the immediate future, has to be accepted with caution, especially 
when it chanees both the volume as well as the terms of borrowing. 
The model may usefully be applied to anticipate a liquidity 
crisis for the Indian economy. While the initial conditions 
relate to the Indian situation for 1965-66, one can choose the 
particular solutions more appropriate to the projections available 
in different estimates. Thus a liberal estimate of the projected 
19 · d · . 'f h . f 
solution 2 while a different 2.ssumption regardinp the interest 
rate and some variations in the values of the variables can lead 
to situation 4 Hith an inevitable liquidity crisis. A conservative 
estimate of the weighted average of interest does not, for ohvious 
reasons, save the situation, as indicated in Solution 5. Solutions 
1 and 5 are possible under a less optim:Lstic assumption rer;arding 
the two exogenous variables, x a.nd re, while solution 6 represents 
the most interesting typr?. of a situation under the given assumption 
of a small value for ~- when imports can be restricted to a minimal 
value, a situation which is not lLcely for India. The solutions, 
taken together, indicate explicitly the. strong nossitility of a 
liquidity crisis for the Indian economy in the not too distant 
future under the existing institutional features of her external 
borrowinp, and her trade potent::.alities. 
export earnings an. import payments Justi ya c oice o 
III. Conclusions 
The anaJ.ysis prov~.<lEF an exen:iE:es L:to the con,:_;e-
quences of external bo::-rovir_g for the recinients when the capital 
inflows are tied to unfr.vourai.1le lnc•.r: tcr;, s u::l.th contractual 
purchases in the current account. The lessons of the exercise 
are instructive for the develop:~ng countries where public 
interest-bearing loans form a ~ajor portion of the total capital 
inflows. There has, however, been a no less striking increase 
in the flow of official transfers (a.swell as local currency 
loans) to these countries during the last two decades. The above 
analysis points out the paradoxical situation where the composition 
of the gross inflow of capital is often incompatible to the 
requirements of the recipients fo~ liouid foreifn resources. 
Thus increases in the volume of tied aids and in official 
transfers (in their present form of commodity e;rants) are incapable 
to meet the liquidity r12..rgin requirements of the borrowine; 
countries. The situation represents a structural imbalance under 
the present circumstances when the donors are unable or unwilling 
to provide liberal loan tenns or free exchange to the recipients 
while the latter find it particularly difficult to reduce the trade 
gap over the course of their economic development. The logical 
corollary of the above for the policy makers is a choice between 
an increased inflow of gross borrowing at less favourable terms 
and a possible change in the institutional parameters like i, 
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a and~ and also, a careful scrutiny of the structural pattern of 
the different variables and the parameters. These can, however, 
always be a short-term solution to a liquidity crisis in terms 
of a rescheduling of loans hy the donor. The device, while 
providin~ in effect 'liquid' resources to the borrower, shelves 
the ,d:wle problem to the longer nm uhen the liquidity problem 
emerges once again while the foreigners are in a position to 
claim a larger portion of the G.:_:,P. than before. 
It may be relevant in the above context to refer to the 
20
efficiency limit for investment postulated in the resource-
gap models of foreign aid. The relative changes in the yield 
of capital beyond the stated limit of efficiency lends itself 
easily to a case of outrieht income grants from the donor country 
1 21 as a substitute. f or f urther trans f ers o oan ·fl capita. 
Similarly, one may advocate a substitution of loans by grants 
whenever the rate of return of investment is low at the borrm-1ing 
country Hith increased costs of such borrowing. The approach, 
while useful with its attempt to rationalise the flmr of resources 
between different countries in terms of the maximisation of world 
income, pre-supposes an institutional set-up which is hardly 
consistent with reality. Thus the existing fiscal and monetary 
set-up in the donor countries hardly permits an unlimited substi­
tutability between loans and grants, or even, betueen loans 
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relating to diffe~ent tena structures. The value of ioans as a 
proportion of G.N.P. in the donor areas and as a share of the total 
value of resource transfers from the same area are determined 
in a given time period when economic institutions do not change. 
The residual part of resource transfers takes the form of loans 
sensitive to a considerable extent to the terms offered in the 
market. Thus the implications of the adverse changes in the terms 
of loans for the aid-cum growth process can hardly be qualified 
by the possibility of compensations with income grants. 
The problem might be entirely different under a situation 
where private capital is more important in the total inflow of 
foreign resources. 1;Jhile the rate of return on such capital might 
even be higher, the absence of repayment obligations under direct 
investment and the stimulative effect of such investment for certain 
exports might make the liquidity condition less difficult. One 
can here refer to the rela~ive ease with which some Latin American 
countries including Brazil, Argentina and t--rexico were able to 
service their external debt durin~ the last decade. The implications 
of private capital inflm-1 , however, ar~. completely different and 
often opposite for the foreign resource gaps and one has to take 
note of different consideratio~s before commenting on the relative 
desirability of any situation. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. "One technical problem seems almost certain to arise, 
if Aid can only take the fonn of P.L. 480 or of loans imported 
for specific projects; it would be impossible for India to find 
the free foreign exchange to cover debt repayments, essential 
materials, etc., and plan for projects not in the Aid programme. 
I doubt whether this would suffice to avert the need for some 
generally available aid --- or at least for Aid which could be 
used to repay trade debts and refinance old loans." Reddaway, 
W.D., "The Role of External Aid: reprinted in The United States 
and the Developing Economies, edited by Ranis, Gustav, pp. 129-
30. (First italics mine) 
2. For the standard exposition of the two-gap models of 
foreign aid which do not explicitly take into account the 
repayment process, see Chenery and Bruno /2/, McKinnon /11/. 
3. The liquidity margin requirement is defined as the 
difference between the total exchange infloHs (from exports and 
from foreign loans) and outflows (due to debt-services and the 
non-project imports) for a country during a certain period. 
4. See Rahman /12/ for the implications of debt-servicing on 
the goal of self-reliance. 
a. To simplify matters, one need not introduce the third 
dimension and be content with two axes representing the average 
loan terms (interest and maturity) and the quantity of loans 
respectively. 
5. The hypothesis can be verified by actual experiences of 
the borrowing countries during the last decade. Thus the 
weighted average of interest rates and amortisations on foreign 
loans repayable in foreign exchange has eone up 
·for India during the period 1956 to 1966. (See Appendix 
table 1) 
6. See Avramoric~ et al, for an excellent exposition of the 
repercussion of debt-charges on the savings-investment gap. 
7. See Qayum A. /10/ 
Under the simplest assumption of an absence of gestation 
and payments lag, the net savings coefficient S* for a certain 
capital inflow K
m 
is represented by the following formula: 
Km
t 
where o = capital: output ratio·: c=m,p. c.; r=rate 
of interest on loans: t = end year of the loan; K = initialm 
capital inflow. 
For a given value of K equal to unity, the value of S* ism 
significantly affected by changes in the different variables of 
the model including rand t. What is more, S* can assume negative 
values for certain ranges of the variables a situation hard 
to justify unless increases in consumption are sufficient to 
compensate it. 
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The analysis, in order to l,e more relevant for practical purposes, 
should be modified by the fellowing considerations: 
(i) That part of the initial capital inflow K may be m 
* consumed. This affects the value of S considerably. 
(ii) That the amount of savings and consumption out of the 
additional domestic product generated by K depends on the m 
choice of the disposable income-unit. The specific assumption 
of the G.D.P. as the disposable unit of income in the Qayum 
analysis may not always confonn to the reality and one may use­
fully introduce alternative assumptions like the GNP concept at 
factor cost or the GNP net of repayments concept as the relevant 
unit of disposable income. The alternative formulations for the 
savings coefficient would be as follows: 
-1 n-1
(a) s I (1 - c) [Ko - K (1 - .--)r] - ~ = n m m t t 
<..!;£.)t-n+ll - + Ks I = !.t S' m n 1 - 1-c* n=l 
0 
-1 n--1 K
(b) S" = (1 - c) [K a - K (1 - -)r - ...E!]n m m t t 
t (1-c)t-n+l 
C'" a .S* = .... 1 -· 
~l n 1 - 1--:: 
O' 
where S' and S" refer to the GNP concepts at factor cost and 
net of repayments respectively. 
8. See Ohlin /7/. 
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9. T-Je define the 'foreip:n resource zap' as the sum of 
merchandise balance and <lebt-servi.,::2 payments (i.e. as the gross 
capital inflow Ft=Mt-Xt+(i+a) Bt) and distinguish it from the 
foreign exchange or the I li1_uicl.ity requirement' Lt in the strict 
sense of the tenn. 
10. See Cooper, Richard, /4/ for an explanation of the 
donor's interest for tied aids in tenns of the liquidity­
requirement. Also see the Appendix table 2 for an actual estimate 
of the proportion of tied loans for India. 
11. The ratio, defined conventionally as the proportion of 
export-earnings absorhed by debt-services, gets an additional 
implication in the above approach towards the theory of foreign 
aid. 
12. The assumption of an exogenous grm-rth rate in exports 
and imports can be justified for a:1 economy Phere imports are 
maintained at a minimum level consister.t nith domestic growth 
targets while the rate of export growtl-'. is subject more to external 
rather than to domestic repercussions. Similarly the model 
assumes away the tenns of trade effect .of the tied loans with 
its hypothesis that the value of A does not influence the real 
content of the grLss inflow of resources. Lastly, the assumption 
of an unchanging interest rate and amortisation period deals 
away with all complications of a difference between the marginal 
and the average terms of borrowing. 
\ 
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13. The Ir.di.an case. i.s illm,trative for the rest of the less 
developed nations which are inclined towards large scale public 
borrowing at conventional terms. Thus India received a large 
amount of capital inflow during the development decade and the 
pattern of such inflows had been fairly representative of the 
more recent trends with a large share of public loans at non-
concessional terms. 
14 The model, as indicated above, excludes transfers and 
other local currency loans which do not call for repayments in free 
exchange. The equations for outstanding indebtedness, Bt and 
for the liquidity margin Lt ac.cordin~ly overestimate such values 
for a given resource·-gap 0\ -- Xt). The numerical computations, 
however, are not significantly c~arr:ed once one mal:es the plausible 
assumption that the rate of incr,?ases in imports and grants 
conform to each other. Thus one may recalculate the time-path 
of Lt on the basis of a different initial value of imports H ' ,-ihich 
0 
is smaller than M by the amount of grants G used to finance such 
0 0 
imports during the initial period. The above, to repeat it, is 
permissible under the assumption that the rate ~or the growth of 
overall imports mis identical to the corresponding rate for the 
growth of grants G . A relatively small ratio of imports to 
0 
transfers during the initial period (as it obtains for India with 
a figure of 0.10 for 1964 in spite of the large absolute value 
of transfer receipts), however, makes the model perfectly general 
even without the necessary qualifications for the initial value 
of M. 
15. The value of A at 0.10 approximates the 12% share 
for non-project loans for the u~utilised portion of loans 
(repayable in foreign exchange) hy the end of 1965-66 (See table 
1 in Appendix) 
The initial conditions inclvde the figures for 1965-66 for 
exports and imports (Rs 8376 r., and Ls 12522m respectively). The 
figures for outstandinr, debt are recorded for 1965 as it is 
reported in a mimeograp:,ed nubJ_ication of the IBPD at Ps 16510m (B )
0 
while the non-availability of dat.s. regardinr; the utilised portion 
of loans for 1966 has 1ed tu ;_1 :r:-01.:ncabout nethod for computinr; 
the corresponding fip,ure for the year. I'nus B
1 
as computed 
from the definition 0£ J'. is sli£;ht1y different from one casel 
to another as the interer,t rates are difff!rent in each case. 
Similarly, the absE:mce of an ind:::pendent official series relating 
to Lt leads to differences in the initial values 1 for different
0 
assumptions regarding the parameters. The qualitative implications 
of the solution, however, are not undermined by the above devices. 
19. The conservative estimates relate to the projections 
by Manmohan Singh /14/ who predicts a mzximum amount of exports 
for 1970-71 at Rs 10,000m and that hy nacDougall G.D.A., /9/ whose 
estimates for imports of 1970-71 specify a minimum of Rs 14,000m 
to 15,000m. The liberal estimate of future projections relate 
to the Perspective Planninr, Division analysis of the Indian 
Planning Commission ,dth its respective est:Lnates of expor~s and 
imports for 1970-71 at ~s 12,25C.in and Ps 13,M,0TI'. 
20. Defined as the 'absorptive capacity' for the borrowing 
countries, 
21. See Pincus /8/, Schmidt /13/ and Cooper /3/. 
APPEFDIX 
Table 1. Average interest rate and Amortisation 
Payments on Loans Repayable in Foreign 
Exchange: India 
Years !Inter:st ra:,e A~ortisation Period 
i (percentage,:,) (1:,:eighted Average) 
j (weightec1. av'c?.rage) 
1956 .70 60 
1957 1.00 S7 
1958 1.06 7L, 
1959 1.32 Id 
1960 " 29L. 7', l. 
1961 3.6G 20 
1962 3.27 ~!6 
1963 3.17 32 
l 
! 1964 3.56 34 
Source: Data supplied by the I.B.F.D. 
Economics Department. October 14, 1966. 
- -Pattern of External Assistance: Share 
of_ Project_ Aid in Tot2_l Loans Repayable 
in Foreign C:urrenc':_ (Fs millions) 
Loans Total (4) as a
Repayable Project percentage
Total Grants in Foreign Aid· Re- share of
Currency payable in 
(5)Foreign 
Currency 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1. Untilisation 
up to Harch 56 2017 702 1241 488 39.3 
2. Undisbursed 
end of March 56 1801 678 882 86 9.7 
3. Utilisation 
end of March 61 14298 1603 6C'79 4096 67.6 
4. Undisbursed 
end of March 61 12541 287 5312 658 12.4 
5. Utilisation 
end of March 66 28503 877 17530 7455 42.5 
16. Undisbursed 
jend of Harch 66 12322 '.216 10?39 9547 88.0 
1 
Source Reserve Bank of India. Reports on Currency and Finance. 1965-66. 
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